Unemployment as the Outcome of a Political Process: Fiscal Redistribution or Wage Rigidity?

Etienne Lehmann ()

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: This article wonders why wage rigidity institutions are so widely effective in OECD countries whereas fiscal instruments can more efficiently redistribute income from high skilled to low skilled workers withj lower unemployment.

Keywords: UNEMPLOYMENT; MINIMUM WAGE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 E24 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:2001.10

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