Financing Losers in Competitive Markets

Andrew Abel () and George J. Mailath ()

Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers from Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research

Abstract: Project with negative expected value cannot obtain financing in competitive capital markets if all potential investors are risk neutral and have identical beliefs about the distribution of the project’s net revenue. We present a series of examples with heterogeneous beliefs in which it is possible for a project to obtain financing even though all investors in the project believe, conditional on the project being undertaken, that the project has a negative expected value. An important feature of the examples is that the differences in beliefs are due only to differences in information, and are not simply arbitrary unexplained differences in opinions.

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Related works:
Working Paper: FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS (1990)
Working Paper: Financing Losers in Competitive Markets
Journal Article: Financing Losers in Competitive Markets (1994)
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