N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

K. Chatterjee and Hamid Sabourian

Working Papers from Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the N-person unaimity bargaining game.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; BARGAINING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pensta:5-99-1

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