Voluntary Provision of a Public Good and Individual Morality

Marc Bilodeau () and Nicolas Gravel ()

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: This paper examines some consequences of the assumption that individuals constrain morally their behaviour in games in general and in games of voluntary provision of public good in particular. Moral behaviour is defined in terms of a maxim which assigns one moral action to every player. Maxims themselves are defined with respect to a system of moral equivalence between individual actions referred to as a system of moral universalization.

Keywords: GAMES; PUBLIC GOODS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality (1997)
Journal Article: Voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9731

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.
Address: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().