The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes Under Imperfect Competition

Simon Anderson (), André de Palma () and Brent Kreider ()

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: This paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit selective sales taxes in imperfectly competitive market. We provide a simple proof of the proposition that ad valorem taxes are welfare-superior to unit taxes in the short run whenproduction costs are identical across firms.

Keywords: TAXES; COMPETITION; PRODUCTS mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 39p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H21 H22 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes under Imperfect Competition (2000)
Working Paper: The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition (1999)
Working Paper: The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes under Imperfect Competition (2002)
Journal Article: The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-09

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Address: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
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