The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence

Sylvester Eijffinger () and Jakob de Haan ()

Princeton Studies in International Economics from International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,

Abstract: It is often argued that a high level of central-band independence coupled with an explicit mandate that the bank aim for price stability are important institutional devices for maintaining that stability. Indeed, a number of countries have recently increased the independence of their central banks in order to raise their commitment to price stability.

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; MONETARY POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 1996
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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence (1995)
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