LAWYERS AS AGENTS OF THE DEVIL IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

Orley Ashenfelter () and David Bloom

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper

Keywords: lawyers; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1993)
Working Paper: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1990)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwdp:57

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper
Address: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON NEW-JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().