Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy

Avinash Kamalakar Dixit () and Elhanan Helpman

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principales'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action.

Keywords: LOBBYING; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy (1996)
Working Paper: Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwpu:179

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs
Address: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON NEW- JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().