Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy
Avinash Dixit () and
Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs
We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principales'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action.
Keywords: LOBBYING; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwpu:179
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