A Theory of Political Compromise

Avinash Kamalakar Dixit (), G.M. Grossmann and Faruk Gul

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We study a political compromise founded on tacit cooperation. Two political parties must share a fixed pie in each of an infinite sequence of periode. In each pary the power has ultimate authority to devide the pie.

Keywords: POLICY MAKING; RISK; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Working Paper: A Theory of Political Compromise (1998)
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