Executive Compensation and Incentives: the Impact of Takeover Legislation

Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan ()

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation.

Keywords: WAGES; TAKEOVERS; INCENTIVES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J33 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation (1998)
Working Paper: Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation (1998)
Working Paper: Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:priwpu:202

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