Abstract:
In this paper we consider the design and implementation of a pay-as-you-go social insurance system as a problem in political economy. We consider whether a society of forward looking rational economic agents would implement a system in which the level of benefits can depend on the relative shares of different age groups in the population. We calibrate a model economy to match long-run features of the US economy and then look at the nature of the social security system that results.
More papers in Working Papers from Rochester, Business - General Address: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, WILLIAM E. SIMON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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