Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance

John Hassler (), J.V.R. Mora, Kjetil Storesletten () and Fabrizio Zilibotti ()

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: In this paper, the authors incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-conomic equilibrium.

Keywords: UNEMPLOYMENT; INSURANCE; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E21 E24 J21 J24 J31 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance (1999)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance (1999)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:665

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