Collusion-Proof Yardstick Competition

Thomas Tangerås ()

Working Papers from Stockholm - International Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper analyses the incentives for collusion when an industry is regulated by means of yardstick competition. The central assumption is that firms must write collusive side contracts before the revelation of private information are unable to communicate later.

Keywords: COMPETITION; COLLUSION; REGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999

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Related works:
Working Paper: COLLUSION-PROOF YARDSTICK COMPETITION (1999)
Journal Article: Collusion-proof yardstick competition (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:stocin:674

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