Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions

Eddie Dekel () and A. Wolinsky

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We consider discrete versions of independent, private-value, first-price auctions. We show for any fixed finite set of possible bids, if the number of participants is large enough, then the set of rationalizable bids involves all players bidding the highest bid that is lower than their private value.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; RATIONALIZATION; EFFICIENCY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions (2000)
Working Paper: Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions (2001)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:00-13

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