Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem

Alex Cukierman ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: This paper surveys and evaluates alternative views regarding the desirable combination of accountability, credibility and trasnparency in the newly created ECB (European Central Bank), including recent controversies regarding publication of minutes, Council member votes and ECB forecasts.

Keywords: ECONOMIC POLICY; SOCIAL CHOICE; GOVERNMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 H11 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:2000-4

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