Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs

Antoine Billot (), A. Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa () and Jean-Marc Tallon ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent`s beliefs in a way that makes them ``more distant`` from the other agent`s beliefs makes the second agent better off.

Keywords: RISK; GAMES; OUTCOME (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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