On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining

Ariel Rubinstein ()

Working Papers from Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies

Keywords: game theory; economic equilibrium; contracts; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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