On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining
Ariel Rubinstein ()
Working Papers from Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies
Keywords: game theory; economic equilibrium; contracts; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavsa:7-92
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