Moral, The Informal Sector, and Unemployment

Ann-Sofie Kolm () and B. Larsen

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.

Keywords: TAX EVASION; WAGES; MORAL; UNEMPLOYMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 J60 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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Working Paper: Moral, the Informal Sector, and Unemployment (2001)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:2001:09

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