Abstract:
Our results seem to provide substantial evidence that joint operating agreement's (JOA) act as constrained rather than unconstrained monopolists in setting ad rates and circulation levels. The constraint of having to produce two dailies binds tightly enough to yield JOA CPM's that are much closer to those of competing papers than those of a single-paper monopolist.
More papers in Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division Address: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ANTITRUST DIVISION, JUDICIARY CENTER BUILDING 555 4TH ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().
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