Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? An Agency Explanation

C.R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen ()

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: This paper presents empirical evidence on why firm become corporate criminals. We investigate the relationship between corporate ownership structure and the prior probability of observing corporate crime.

Keywords: ENTERPRISES; CRIMES; LAW (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 K22 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:96-07

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