A Robust test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product

Luke Froeb and G.J. Werden

Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Abstract: Antiturst enforcement agencies and courts use net effect on price as a touchstone for the legality of mergers. This paper derives a simple, and completely general, condition for implementing that standard when industry equilibrium is static Nash in qualities (Cournot).

Keywords: MERGERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K20 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of a homogeneous product (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:usjuat:97-1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division
Address: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ANTITRUST DIVISION, JUDICIARY CENTER BUILDING 555 4TH ST. N.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 U.S.A..
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Thomas Krichel ().