Migration and the Evolution of Conventions

Working Papers from Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas

Abstract: This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to play a coordination game and can adjust both their strategy and location. Their decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.

Keywords: MIGRATION; CONVENTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Migration and the Evolution of Conventions (1996)
Journal Article: Migration and the evolution of conventions (2004)
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