Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying

Richard Boylan ()

Washington University from Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University

Abstract: The number of private bills passed in a year represents the extent with which Congress wants to make administrative decisions instead of delegating these decisions to the bureaucracy. Scandalous behavior by Coongresspersons has affected the number of private bills by changing the voter's belief of the likelihood that a Congressperson is a crook. Congresspersons are less likely to be willing to introduce a private bill and Congress passes public laws that delegate administrative decisions to the bureaucracy.

Keywords: DECISION; MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Working Paper: Private bills: a theoretical and empirical study of lobbying (1998)
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