Stable Coalition Structure with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives

J. Greenberg and Shlomo Weber ()

Working Papers from York (Canada) - Department of Economics

Keywords: economic equilibrium; game theory; microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Working Paper: Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives (1991)
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