Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning

M. le Breton and Shlomo Weber ()

Working Papers from York (Canada) - Department of Economics

Keywords: economic models; economic analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Working Paper: Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning (1995)
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