Independência do Banco Central e Equilíbrio Fiscal: Algumas observações para o caso brasileiro

Helder Ferreira de Mendonça ()

No 14, Working Papers from Universidade Federal do Paraná, Department of Economics

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze the main theoretical arguments for the analysis of the conduction of monetary policy on the fiscal side. Besides this, an analysis is made of the possible effects on the fiscal balance from the conduction of the monetary policy in the search for price stability after the Real Plan and due to an increase in the central bank independence (CBI) in the Brazilian case. The findings denote that the strategy for the conduction of the adopted monetary policy and the increase in the degree of CBI did not contribute to an improvement in the fiscal balance.

Keywords: central bank independence; inflation; public debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: Creation Date corresponds to the year in which the paper was published on the Department of Economics website. The paper may have been written a small number of months before its publication date.

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fup:wpaper:0014

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