The Core Can be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps

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Abstract: This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of TU games with non-empty cores the core can be reached via a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.

Keywords: Dynamic cooperative game; indirect dominance; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-06-26

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core can be accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (2008)
Working Paper: The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps (2002)
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