The Core of a Partition Function Game

Grand Coalition from Grand Coalition Web Site

Abstract: We consider partition function games and introduce new definitions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive definition of the core where residual ubgames are considered as games with fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.

Keywords: core; partition function; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01-29
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Core of a Partition Function Game (2008)
Working Paper: The Core of a Partition Function Game (2001)
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