A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

Grand Coalition from Grand Coalition Web Site

Abstract: In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions.

Keywords: core; partition function; externalities; behavioural assumptions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-19

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2002)
Working Paper: A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons (2008)
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