Rodney Ludema (Georgetown University) and Anna Maria Mayda (Georgetown University and CEPR) ()
Additional contact information Rodney Ludema (Georgetown University) and Anna Maria Mayda (Georgetown University and CEPR): Department of Economics, Georgetown University, http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ludemar/ Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Maria Mayda ()
Abstract:
The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship. Classification-JEL Codes: F13, D7
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Marcia Suss Administrative Officer Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036 http://econ.georgetown.edu/