Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions
James Albrecht (),
Pieter Gautier () and
Susan Vroman ()
No gueconwpa~13-13-05, Working Papers from Georgetown University, Department of Economics
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions. We generalize the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many on one) meetings and private information. We consider both the case in which buyers learn their valuations before visiting a seller and the case in which they learn their valuations after visiting the seller. We also allow for seller heterogeneity with respect to reservation values.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/wtzyny6r1r7g13qmki6i Full text (text/html)
Journal Article: Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~13-13-05
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Roger Lagunoff Professor of Economics Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Georgetown University, Department of Economics Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036.
Series data maintained by Marcia Suss ().