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Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory

Laurent Bouton (), Micael Castanheira () and Aniol Llorente-Saguer ()

No gueconwpa~15-15-03, Working Papers from Georgetown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effect of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions: sincere voting is a predominant strategy under aggregate uncertainty, whereas without aggregate uncertainty, voters massively coordinate their votes behind one candidate, who wins almost surely.

Keywords: Rational Voter Model; Multicandidate Elections; Plurality; Aggregate Uncertainty; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Date: 2015-04-16
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Related works:
Journal Article: Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Multicandidate Elections: Aggregate Uncertainty in the Laboratory Downloads
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