EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

What You Don't Know Won't Hurt You: A Laboratory Analysis of Betrayal Aversion

Jason Aimone () and Daniel Houser ()
Additional contact information
Jason Aimone: Interdsciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University

No 1007, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Abstract: Trust promotes economic growth and development, and previous research has shed much light on reciprocity and other motives for trusting decisions. Why people choose not to trust has received substantially less attention, perhaps in part because not trusting is predicted by standard economic theory: selfish people consider the (perhaps subjective) stochastic nature of the environment and make the earnings-maximizing decision. This explanation is incomplete: we provide evidence from a laboratory analysis with an investment game that people¡¯s decisions vary according to how an environment¡¯s uncertainty will be resolved. In particular, if resolving uncertainty requires an investor to learn whether her trustee chose to betray then she is much less likely to trust. Our data thus provide evidence that ¡°betrayal aversion¡± detrimentally affects propensities for trusting decisions. Our results also emphasize the importance of impersonal, institution-mediated exchange in promoting investment and economic efficiency.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.ices-gmu.org/RePEc/pdf/1007.pdf Latest version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Jingnan Chen ().

 
Page updated 2009-10-27
Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1007