Neural Responses to Sanction Threats in Two-Party Economic Exchange
Jian Li (),
Erte Xiao (),
Daniel Houser () and
P. Read Montague ()
Additional contact information
Jian Li: Department of Psychology, New York University
P. Read Montague: Menninger Department of Psychiatry & Behavioral Sciences, Baylor College of Medicine
No 1012, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science
Sanctions are used ubiquitously to enforce obedience to social norms. Recent field studies and laboratory experiments have demonstrated, however, that cooperation is sometimes reduced when incentives meant to promote pro-social decisions are added to the environment. Although a variety of explanations have been suggested, the neural foundations of this effect have not been fully explored. Using a modified trust game, we find trustees reciprocate relatively less when facing sanction threats, and the presence of sanctions significantly reduces trusteeÕs brain activities involved in social reward valuation (VMPFC, LOFC, and Amygdala), while simultaneously increases brain activities in parietal cortex previously implicated in rational decision making. Moreover, we find that neural activity in trusteeÕs VMPFC area predicts her future level of cooperation under both sanction and no-sanction conditions, and that this predictive activity can be dynamically modulated by the presence of a sanction threat.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-neu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (14) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1012
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Stan Tsirulnikov ().