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Fairness and Cheating

Daniel Houser (), Stefan Vetter () and Joachim Winter ()
Additional contact information
Stefan Vetter: University of Munich

No 1019, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Abstract: We present evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that individuals who believe they were treated unfairly in an interaction with another person are more likely to cheat in a subsequent unrelated game. Specifically, subjects first participated in a dictator game. They then flipped a coin in private and reported the outcome. Subjects could increase their total payoff by cheating, i.e., lying about the outcome of the coin toss. We found that subjects were more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of the coin flip when: 1) they received either nothing or a very small transfer from the dictator; and 2) they claimed to have been treated unfairly.

Keywords: cheating; fairness; experimental design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-soc
Date: 2011-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Fairness and cheating (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Fairness and cheating (2012)
Working Paper: Fairness and Cheating (2010) Downloads
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