The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Pablo Brañas-Garza (), García-Muñoz, Teresa and Shoshana Neuman ()
Additional contact information
García-Muñoz, Teresa: Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa - Universidad de Granada
Shoshana Neuman: Departament of Economics, Bar-Ilan University

No 08/01, Papers on Economics of Religion from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Keywords: carrot/stick; high stakes; rewards; punishment; Economics of Religion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2008-01-15
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http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/paoner/per08_01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:paoner:08/01

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