Moral Framing in Dictator Games by Short Sentences

Pablo Brañas-Garza () and Antonio J Morales ()

No 05/06, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room design, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards. Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reciprocity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral” sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modified DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selfish behavior vanishes.

Keywords: dictator game; framing e ?ect; social issues; fairness; reciprocity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D64 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2005-05-22
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/06

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