Political Election on Legal Retirement Age

Juan A. Lacomba () and Francisco Lagos ()

No 05/10, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: We use a lifecycle model in which individuals differ by age and by wage in order to analyze a pairwise majority voting process on the legal retirement age. We consider two di ?erent retirement regimes. In the first one the retirees do not return to the labor market, regardless the new retirement age. In the second one, they have to return if this age is higher than her own age. We show that the final outcome of the voting process will crucially depend on the retirement regime as well as on the parameters of the Social Security, that is, the redistributive character of the system and the present legal retirement age.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab and nep-pol
Date: 2005-06-01
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Journal Article: Political election on legal retirement age (2007)
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