Postponing the Legal Retirement Age

Juan A. Lacomba () and Francisco Lagos ()

No 05/13, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, firstly, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the redistributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to postpone the pensionable age.

Keywords: Legal retirement age; pension benefits; redistribution level (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D91 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-reg
Date: 2005-06-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/13

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