The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation

Pablo Brañas-Garza (), Miguel A. Durán and Maria Paz Espinosa ()
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Miguel A. Durán: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada

No 05/21, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: This paper explores new motivations behind giving. Specifically, it focuses on personal involvement and responsibility to explain why decision makers give positive amounts in dictatorial decisons. The experiment is designed to uncover these motivations. Subjects face the problem of a dictator's allocation of an indivisible pie P to one of two players; indivisibility creates an extremely unequal outcome and the dictator is given a chance to correct this outcome at a cost. The willingness to pay to correct the outcome is examined under different scenarios so that we learn about several features concerning preferences.

Keywords: Fairness; Dictator game; Moral cost. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
Date: 2005-10-17
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/21

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