Why gender based game theory?

Pablo Brañas-Garza ()

No 06/08, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: The behavior of men and women in a number of games free of social issues is explored. The analysis is conducted for simple (2x2) and complex (guessing) games and in static and repeated settings. No gender effect is observed either in static nor in repeated games. It is concluded that gender bias vanishes in the absence of social issues.

Keywords: Gender bias; dominated strategies; Nash equilibrium; learning.; Gender bias; dominated strategies; Nash equilibrium; learning. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ltv
Date: 2006-10-19
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