Unraveling Public Good Games

Pablo Brañas-Garza () and Maria Paz Espinosa ()

No 08/01, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and they do very little updating of beliefs.

Keywords: public good game; end game effect; beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-mkt
Date: 2008-05-12
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/01

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