Income Redistribution and Public Good Provision in a Diverse Society

Selim Jürgen Ergun ()

No 09/04, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-speci?c public good. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when stable coalitions exist and obtain that for that to occur o¢ ce bene?ts should exceed a certain level. I analyze how this critical level and the set of policies implemented are a¤ected by the income levels and the degree of diversity. For both o¢ ce and policy-motivated parties the same result holds but the critical level might be lower.

Keywords: Electoral competition; coalition formation; public goods; income redistribution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H40 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pke and nep-pol
Date: 2009-09-14
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers09_04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:09/04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
Address: Campus Universitario de Cartuja
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Angel Solano Garcia. ().