Outside Options in Nash Bargaining

Patrick Martin and Asha Sadanand

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the connection between Nash bargaining and non-cooperative bargaining, the so-called Nash program, to solve the question of whether outside options should be considered as a the disagreement point.

Keywords: BARGAINING; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1996-3

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Dianqin Wang ().