Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Shareholders Own More than One Share

Charles Bram Cadsby () and E. Maynes

Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process in the laboratory. An equilibrium outcome in which value-increasing takeovers always just succeed fails to emerge. Rather, tendered shares cycle around the equilibrium level with successful takeovers occuring more often toward the end of each game. Although game-theoretic results predict that neither bid level nor bid type should affect the number of shraes tendered nor the extent to which bids succeed, bith factors are found to be significant, albeit less so as each game draws to a close.

Keywords: TAKEOVERS; GAME THEORY; SHARES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 C7 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:1998-3

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