On the Effective Design of the Efficiency Defence

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais () and Tropeano, Jean-Philippe ()
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Tropeano, Jean-Philippe: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: The efficiency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream consequences of the efficiency defence should equally be considered, namely the improvement of the distribution of notified mergers through the incentives it provides towards more efficient mergers. First of all, we show that even if the Competition Authority may not tell apart the mergers that rightfully invoke the efficiency defence from those that do not, allowing such a procedure can lead to a lower post-merger price. Secondly, we study the impact of merger remedies on the incentives conveyed by the efficiency defence, and conclude on the optimal design of the efficiency defence procedure.

Keywords: Merger control; efficiency defence; merger remedies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00113503/en/
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Working Paper: On the effective design of the efficiency defence (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00113503_v1

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