Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais () and Tropeano, Jean-Philippe ()
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Tropeano, Jean-Philippe: EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - CNRS : UMR8594 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers control by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more efficient one, wich conforms with the recommendations of competition policy practitioners. However, since cost savings are private information of merging firms, the Competition Authority will require them to reveal their efficiency gains, so as to tailor the optimal remedy. We propose a revelation mechanism combining the use of divestitures with the regulation of their sale price. We discuss the opportunity of such a merger policy tool, and argue that in practice it may be used to signal the efficiency gains of notified mergers.

Keywords: Merger control; structural merger remedies; asymmetric information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00194906/en/

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Related works:
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains (2006)
Working Paper: Negotiating remedies: revealing the merger efficiency gains (2008)
Journal Article: Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00194906_v1

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