Do French student really bid sincerely?

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stephane Luchini (), Joule, Robert-Vincent () and Jason Shogren ()
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Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579
Joule, Robert-Vincent: LPS-EHESS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Do French Students really bid sincerely in real and hypothetical incentive compatible auctions? Recent evidence suggests they do, which goes counter to most observed bidding behavior in theUnited States, and supports the idea that cultural differences may explain bidding behavior more than economic circumstances. Herein we run a robustness check by exploring bidding behavior in classic Vickrey auction for real and hypothetical values in the two largest cities (Paris and Lyon). Two striking results emerge–(1) French students bid sincerely; and (2) no hypothetical bias exists.

Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00277282/en/

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00277282_v1

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