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Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

Nicolas Jacquemet (), Stephane Luchini (), Joule, Robert-Vincent () and Jason Shogren ()
Additional contact information
Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579
Joule, Robert-Vincent: LPS-EHESS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias; Earned Money (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction (2009) Downloads
Journal Article: Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second-price auction (2009) Downloads
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