Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction
Nicolas Jacquemet (),
Stephane Luchini (),
Joule, Robert-Vincent () and
Jason Shogren ()
Additional contact information Stephane Luchini: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579
Joule, Robert-Vincent: LPS-EHESS - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)
Abstract:
Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.