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Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency

Alessandro Melcarne () and Giovanni Ramello ()

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Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-univ-paris10.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01386058
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Published in Review of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, 2015, 11, pp.149 - 169

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